This paper establishes tight bounds on the best-case time-complexity of distributed atomic read/write storage implementations that tolerate worst-case conditions. We study asynchronous robust implementations where a writer and a set of reader processes (clients) access an atomic storage implemented over a set of 2t+b+1 server processes of which t can fail: b of these can be malicious and the rest can crash. We define a lucky operation (read or write) as one that runs synchronously and without contention. It is often argued in practice that lucky operations are the most frequent. We determine the exact conditions under which a lucky operation can be fast, namely expedited in onecommunication round-trip with no data authentication. We show that every lucky write (resp., read) can be fast despite f w (resp., f r ) actual failures, if and only if f w + f r ≤ t − b.
Introduction
It is considered good practice to plan for the worst and hope for the best. This practice has in particular governed many complexity studies in dependable distributed computing [9, 18, 10] .
It is indeed admitted that distributed algorithms ought to tolerate bad conditions with many processes failing or competing for shared resources such as communication channels. Under these conditions, the distributed system is clearly asynchronous as there is no realistic bound on relative process speeds and communication delays.
Fortunately, those bad conditions are considered rare and whilst it is good to make sure algorithms tolerate them when they happen, one would rather optimize the algorithms for the common, not that bad conditions. It is for instance often argued that distributed systems are synchronous most of the time, that there is generally little contention on the same resources at any given point in time [4] and that failures are rare. Hence, when measuring the complexity of a distributed algorithm and judging whether the algorithm is fast, it is reasonable to measure its (time) complexity under such best case conditions. An algorithm that would be efficient under rare worst case conditions and slow under frequent best case conditions, would not be practically appealing.
In this paper, we study distributed algorithms that implement the classical single-writer multi-reader (SWMR) atomic storage abstraction [17] : a fundamental notion in dependable distributed computing [20, 3] . This abstraction, also called the SWMR atomic register, captures the semantics of a shared variable on which processes, called clients, can concurrently invoke read and write operations. Atomicity stipulates that (1) a read r must return a value written by a concurrent write (if any), or the last value written, and (2) if a read r that precedes r returns value v, then r must return either v or a later value.
We consider robust, sometimes called wait-free, implementations of an atomic storage where no client relies on any other client to complete any of its operations: the other clients might have all stopped their computation (crashed) [17, 14, 2] . The storage abstraction is implemented over a set of 2t + b + 1 server processes of which t can fail: b of these can be malicious, deviating arbitrarily from the algorithm assigned to them, while the rest can crash. In this paper, we assume that stored data is not authenticated. 1 It is a known result that 2t + b + 1 is a resilience lower bound for any safe [17] storage implementation in an asynchronous system [21] 2 and, to ensure atomicity with this resilience, more than one communication-round trip is needed between a client (the writer or the readers) and the servers [1, 11] . In [2] for instance, even if only server crashes are tolerated (i.e., b = 0), the reader needs to send a message to all servers, wait for their replies, determine the latest value, send another message to all servers, wait for replies, and then return the value. A total of two communication round-trips is thus required for every read operation.
The goal of this paper is to determine the exact conditions under which optimally resilient implementations that tolerate asynchrony and contention (worst-case conditions), can expedite operations (reads or writes) whenever the system is synchronous and there is no contention. We say that an operation is lucky if (a) it runs synchronously and (b) without contention. In short, this means that (a) the client that invokes the operation reaches and receives replies from all non-faulty servers in one communication round-trip, and (b) no other client is invoking a conflicting operation (no read is overlapping with a write).
We define the notion of a fast operation as one that executes in one communication round-trip between a client and the servers. Indeed, it is usual to measure the time complexity of an operation by counting the number of communication rounds needed to complete that operation, irrespective of the local computation complexity at any process involved in the operation (server or client). The rationale behind this measure is that local computation is negligible with respect to communication rounds (assuming data is authenticated).
This paper shows that in order for every lucky write to be fast, despite at most f w actual server failures, and every lucky read to be fast, despite at most f r actual server failures, it is necessary and sufficient that the sum f w +f r is not greater than t − b. This result expresses the precise tradeoff between the thresholds f w and f r .
We proceed as follows. We first give an algorithm with 2t + b + 1 servers that tolerates asynchrony and t server failures among which b can be malicious: the algorithm allows every lucky read (resp., lucky write) to be fast in any execution where up to f w (resp., f r ) servers fail, provided f w + f r = t − b. Note that all f w (resp. f r ) failures can be malicious, provided f w ≤ b (resp. f r ≤ b). The challenge underlying the design of our algorithm is the ability to switch to slower operations that preserve atomicity under the worst conditions: asynchrony and contention, as well as t failures out of which b can be malicious, with 2t+b+1 servers (optimal resilience [21] ). A key component of our algorithm is a signalling mechanism we call "freezing", used by the reader to inform the writer of the presence of contention. Interestingly, this mechanism does not rely on intercommunication among servers, nor on servers pushing messages to the clients.
We then give our matching upper bound result by showing that no optimally resilient asynchronous algorithm can have every lucky write be fast despite f w actual server failures and every lucky read be fast despite f r actual server failures, if f w + f r > t − b. Our upper bound proof is based on indistinguishability arguments that exploit system asynchrony, the possibility of some servers to return an arbitrary value, and the requirement that every write wr (resp., read rd) must be fast whenever wr (resp., rd) is lucky and at most f w (resp., f r ) servers are faulty. To strengthen our tight bound, we assume in our proof a general model in which servers can exchange messages and even send unsolicited messages.
We use the very fact that our upper bound proof requires every lucky operation (in particular, every lucky read) to be fast, to (1) drastically increase the sum of the thresholds f w and f r to f w = t − b and f r = t, by allowing a certain number, yet just a small fraction, of lucky read operations to be slow. We also highlight the fact that (2) our upper bound is inherent to atomic storage implementations, but does not apply to weaker semantics; we discuss how to modify our algorithm and get a regular [17] storage implementation in which every lucky write (resp., read) is fast despite the failure of f w = t − b (resp., f r = t) servers. We prove the optimality of (1) and (2) by showing, along the lines of [1] , that no optimally resilient safe [17] algorithm can achieve fast writes despite the failure of more than t − b servers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present in Section 2 our general system model together with few definitions that are used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we present our algorithm, which we prove optimal in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss several alternatives to the assumptions underlying our result. We conclude the paper by discussing the related work in Section 6.
System Model and Definitions
The distributed system we consider consists of three disjoint sets of processes: a set servers of size S containing processes {s 1 , ..., s S }, a singleton writer containing a single process {w}, and a set readers of size R containing processes {r 1 , ..., r R }. We denote a set of clients as a union of the sets writer and readers. We assume that every client may communicate with any server by message passing using point-to-point reliable communication channels. When presenting our algorithm, we assume that servers send messages only in reply to a message received from a client: i.e., servers do not communicate among each other, nor send unsolicited messages. However, to strengthen our tight upper bound, we relax these assumptions. To simplify the presentation, we assume a global clock, which, however, is not accessible to either clients or servers.
Runs and Algorithms
The state of the communication channel between processes p and q is viewed as a set mset p,q = mset q,p containing messages that are sent but not yet received. We assume that every message has two tags which identify the sender and the receiver. processes proceeds in steps of A. A step of A is denoted by a pair of process id and message set p, M (M might be ∅). In step sp = p, M , process p atomically does the following (we say that p takes step sp): (1) removes the messages in M from mset p, * , (2) applies M and its current state st p to A p , which outputs a new state st p and a set of messages to be sent, and then (3) p adopts st p as its new state and puts the output messages in mset p, * . A malicious process p can perform arbitrary actions: (1) it can remove/put arbitrary messages from/into mset p, * and (2) it can change its state in an arbitrary manner. Note that the malicious process p cannot remove/put any message into a point-to-point channel between any two non-malicious processes q and r.
Given any algorithm A, a run of A is an infinite sequence of steps of A taken by non-malicious processes, and actions of malicious processes, such that the following properties hold for each non-malicious process p: (1) initially, for each non-malicious process q, mset p,q = ∅, (2) the current state in the first step of p is a special state Init, (3) for each step p, M of A, and for every message m ∈ M , p is the receiver of m and ∃q, mset p,q that contains m immediately before the step p, M is taken, and (4) if there is a step that puts a message m in mset p, * such that p is the receiver of m and p takes an infinite number of steps, then there is a subsequent step p, M such that m ∈ M . A partial run is a finite prefix of some run. A (partial) run r extends some partial run pr if pr is a prefix of r. At the end of a partial run, all messages that are sent but not yet received are said to be in transit.
We say that a non-malicious process p is correct in a run r if p takes an infinite number of steps of A in r. Otherwise a non-malicious process is crash-faulty. We say that a crashfaulty process p crashes at step sp in a run, if sp is the last step of p in that run. Malicious and crash-faulty processes are called faulty. In any run, at most t servers might be faulty, out of which at most b ≤ t may be malicious. In this paper we consider only optimally resilient implementations [21] , where the total number of servers S equals 2t + b + 1.
For presentation simplicity, we do not explicitly model the initial state of a process, nor the invocations and responses of the read/write operations of the atomic storage to be implemented. We assume that the algorithm A initializes the processes, and schedules invocation/response of operations (i.e., A modifies the states of the processes accordingly). However, we say that p invokes op at step sp, if A modifies the state of a process p in step sp so as to invoke an operation (and similarly for response).
Atomic Register
A sequential (read/write) storage is a data structure accessed by a single process. It provides two operations: WRITE(v), which stores v in the storage, and READ(), which returns the last value stored. An atomic storage is a distributed data structure that may be concurrently accessed by multiple clients and yet provides an "illusion" of a sequential storage to the accessing clients.
We refer the readers to [17, 20, 14, 15 ] for a formal definition of an atomic storage, and we simply recall below what is required to state and prove our results.
We assume that each client invokes at most one operation at a time (i.e., does not invoke the next operation until it receives the response for the current one). Only readers invoke READ operations and only the writer invokes WRITE operations. We further assume that the initial value of a storage is a special value ⊥, which is not a valid input value for a WRITE. We say that an operation op is complete in a (partial) run if the run contains a response step for op. In any run, we say that a complete operation op1 precedes operation op2 (or op2 succeeds op1) if the response step of op1 precedes the invocation step of op2 in that run. If neither op1 nor op2 precede the other, the operations are said to be concurrent.
An algorithm implements a robust atomic storage if every run of the algorithm satisfies wait-freedom and atomicity properties. Wait-freedom states that if a client invokes an operation and does not crash, eventually the client receives a response (i.e., operation completes), independently of the possible crashes of any other client. Here we give a definition of atomicity for the SWMR atomic storage.
In the single-writer setting, WRITEs in a run have a natural ordering which corresponds to their physical order. Denote by wr k the k th WRITE in a run (k ≥ 1), and by val k the value written by the k th WRITE. Let val 0 = ⊥. We say that a partial run satisfies atomicity if the following properties hold: (1) if a READ returns x then there is k such that val k = x, (2) if a READ rd is complete and it succeeds some WRITE wr k (k ≥ 1), then rd returns val l such that l ≥ k, (3) if a READ rd returns val k (k ≥ 1), then wr k either precedes rd or is concurrent to rd, and (4) if some READ rd1 returns val k (k ≥ 0) and a READ rd2 that succeeds rd1 returns val l , then l ≥ k.
Lucky Operations
A complete READ/WRITE operation op by the client c is called synchronous, if the message propagation time for every message m exchanged in time period [t opinv , t opresp ], where op is invoked at t opinv and completed at time t opresp , between client c and any server s i is bounded by the constant t c,si known to the client c. A complete operation op is contention-free if it is not concurrent with any other WRITE wr. An operation op is lucky if it is synchronous and contention-free. Note that, in our SWMR setting, every synchronous WRITE operation is lucky. 
Fast Operations
Basically, we say that a complete operation op is fast if op completes in one communication round; otherwise, op is slow. In other words, in a fast READ (resp., WRITE):
1. The reader (resp., writer) sends messages to a subset of servers in the system (possibly all servers).
2. Servers on receiving such a message reply to the reader (resp., writer) before receiving any other messages. More precisely, any server s i on receiving a message
, where m is sent by the reader (resp., writer) on invoking a READ (resp., WRITE), replies to m either in step sp1 itself, or in a subsequent step sp2, such that s i does not receive any message in any step between sp1 and sp2 (including sp2). Intuitively, this requirement forbids the server to wait for some other message before replying to m.
3. upon the reader (resp., writer) receives a sufficient number k of such replies, a READ (resp., WRITE) completes.
3 Algorithm Proposition 1. There is an optimally resilient implementation I of a SWMR robust atomic storage, such that: (1) in any partial run in which at most f w servers fail, every lucky WRITE operation is fast, and (2) in any partial run in which at most f r servers fail, every lucky READ operation is fast, where f w + f r = t − b.
In the following, we first give an overview of the algorithm and then we give a detailed description of the WRITE and READ implementations. 3 
Overview
If a WRITE is synchronous (i.e., lucky) and at most f w servers are faulty, the WRITE is fast and completes in a single (communication) round. A slow WRITE takes an additional two rounds. The READ operation also proceeds in series of rounds (a fast READ, completes in a single round). In every round, a client sends a message to all servers and awaits a response from S − t different servers. In addition, in the first round of every operation, a client c awaits responses until the expiration of the timer, set according to the message propagation bounds t c,s * (see Section 2.3).
Roughly speaking, a fast WRITE, writes the new value in at least S − f w servers. Consider a lucky READ rd, such that the last WRITE that precedes rd is a fast WRITE wr that writes v f ast and that at most f r servers are faulty. In this case, v f ast is written into at least S − f w servers, out of which a set X containing at least S − f w − f r = 2b + t + 1 servers are correct. Since no value later than v f ast is written before rd completes (since rd is lucky), all servers from the set X will respond with v f ast in the first round of rd. Similarly, if wr is a slow WRITE, in every (out of three) rounds, wr writes v slow to at least S − t servers. In this case, a lucky READ rd that comes after wr will read, in its first round, a value v slow written in the third (final) round of wr from at least S − t − f r ≥ b + 1 correct servers. In both cases, our algorithm guarantees that rd is fast and that it returns v f ast (resp., v slow ) at the end of the first round.
However, since rd is fast, it does not send any additional messages to servers after the first round. Therefore, when returning a value v, a fast READ rd must itself "leave" behind enough information so the subsequent READS will not return the older value. This is precisely the case, when rd encounters a set X containing at least 2b + t + 1 (resp., b + 1) servers that "witness" a fast (resp., slow) WRITE. To illustrate this, consider a READ rd by some reader r j that succeeds rd. In addition, for simplicity, assume that no WRITE operation that succeeds wr is invoked (naturally, the correctness of our algorithm does not rely on this assumption). In case wr is fast, r j is guaranteed to receive a response from at least 2b + t + 1 − (t + b) = b + 1 servers that belong to the set X, in every round of rd , overwhelming the number of responses from malicious servers (at most b) that may be trying to mislead r j . Now consider the case where wr is slow. Out of at least b+1 servers that "witness" a third (final) round of wr and respond to a fast READ rd, at least one is non-malicious, which means that the second round of the write wr completed and a set Y containing at least S − t − b = t + 1 non-malicious servers "witnessed" the second round of wr. Reader r j is guaranteed to receive a response from at least one non-malicious server s i , that belongs to the set Y in every round of rd . Roughly speaking, s i claims that the first round of wr completed and that a set Z of at least S − t − t = b + 1 correct servers "witnessed" the first round of wr. All the servers from set Z will eventually respond to rd confirming the claims of s i .
A value v is returned only if at least b + 1 servers report the exact value v. Since servers do not store the entire history of all the values they receive, in the case the writer issues an unbounded number of WRITEs and if readers do not inform the writer about their (slow) READs, server data can repeatedly be overwritten. This leads to the impossibility of confirming any value at b + 1 servers. To solve this issue, our algorithm employs a careful signalling between the readers and the writer, a mechanism we call freezing. Roughly, to initiate freezing, a slow READ rd by reader r j writes its own timestamp ts rj to all servers. Every server s i appends ts rj to its reply to the first round message of every subsequent WRITE (until the writer "freezes" the value for rd ). As soon as the writer receives ts rj from at least b + 1 different servers, the writer "freezes" the value for rd and writes it in the dedicated server field, f rozen rj . Our algorithm guarantees that the writer "freezes" at most one value per (slow) READ. The READ rd reads the servers' value of f rozen rj and is guaranteed to eventually return a value.
Finally, a slow READ writes back the value v it returns in a well-known manner [2] . The writeback procedure follows the communication pattern of the WRITE operation and, hence, takes three communication rounds.
WRITE implementation
The pseudocode of the WRITE implementation is given in Figure 1 .
The WRITE operation consists of two phases: pre-write (PW) phase and write (W) phase. The writer w begins the PW phase of operation wr = W RIT E(v) by increasing its local timestamp ts, updating its pw variable to reflect the new timestamp-value pair ts, v and triggering the timer T (line 3). Then, the writer sends the P W ts, pw, w, f rozen message to all servers (line 4). The field f rozen of the P W message is sent optionally in case the writer has to "freeze" a value for some ongoing READ. On reception of a P W ts, pw , w , * message, every server updates its local copy of pw and w, if these are older than pw and w , respectively. Even if P W.pw and P W.w are older than the servers' local copies pw and w, servers take into account the information in the f rozen field of the PW message (lines 5-6, Fig. 3 ). Servers reply to the writer with a P W ACK ts, newread message. In the optional newread field, servers inform the writer about the slow READS that have difficulties returning a value.
In the PW phase, the writer awaits both for valid responses 4 to the P W message from S − t different servers and the expiration of the timer. The writer completes the PW phase by executing the f reezevalues() procedure, that consists of local computations only (line 7). If the writer received at least S − f w valid P W ACK messages, the WRITE completes. Otherwise, the writer proceeds to the second, W phase.
The f reezevalues() procedure detects ongoing slow READS. Namely, in every READ invocation, the reader r j increases its local timestamp tsr j and, unless the READ is fast, r j stores this timestamp into servers' variable ts rj . In 4 A valid response to a P W ts, * , * , * message is a P W ACK ts, * message, with the same ts. % pre-write (PW) phase 4: send P W ts, pw, w, f rozen to all servers 5: wait for P W ACKi ts, newread from S − t servers and expired(T) 6: f rozen := ∅; w := ts, v 7: freezevalues() 8: if P W ACKi ts, * received from S − fw servers then return(OK) 9: else for round= 2 to 3 do % write (W) phase 10:
send W round, ts, pw to all servers 11:
wait for reception of W RIT E ACKi round, ts from S − t servers 12: return(OK) } freezevalues() is { 13: (∀rj , |{i : (P W ACKi.ts = ts) ∧ (( rj , tsr j ∈ ∈ P W ACKi.newread) ∧ (tsr j > read ts every round of WRITE operation, servers piggyback those timestamps along the id of the issuing reader to P W ACK message within the newread field, in case the writer did not already "freeze" a value for this READ (lines 5-7 Fig. 3 ). When the writer detects b+1 servers that report a timestamp for the reader r j (ts rj ) higher than the writer's locally stored value of read ts[r j ] (line 13, Fig. 1 ), the writer updates its read ts[r j ] value to the b + 1 st highest ts rj value received in the newread fields of the valid responses to the P W message (line 14, Fig. 1 ) and "freezes" the current value of the timestamp value pair pw for the reader r j , by assigning f rozen := f rozen∪ r j , pw, read ts[r j ] . The set f rozen is sent to all servers within the P W message of the next WRITE invocation. On reception of a P W message with a non-empty field f rozen, servers update their local variables f rozen rj if the frozen value matches the timestamp ts rj stored at the server, or if it is newer (line 6, Fig. 3 ). The f reezevalues() procedure ensures wait-freedom in runs in which the writer issues an unbounded number of WRITEs.
The write (W) phase takes two rounds. Pseudocode of W phase is depicted in lines 9-12, Fig. 1 and lines 12-17, Fig. 3 . In each of the rounds, the writer sends the W round, ts, pw message to all servers and awaits S − t valid responses from different servers. At the end of the second round of W phase, WRITE completes.
READ implementation
The pseudocode of our READ implementation is given in Figure 2 . At the beginning of every READ operation, the reader r j increases its local timestamp tsr j . The reader r j proceeds by repeatedly invoking rounds (until it can safely return a value) that consist of: (1) writing the timestamp tsr j to variable ts rj at every server. In every round r j awaits S − t server responses. The first round of every READ is specific: (1) r j does not write tsr j to servers and (2) r j waits for both at least S − t responses and for the timer triggered at the beginning of the round to expire. if (rnd > rndi) then 25:
rndi := rnd ; pwi := pw ; wi := w ; vwi := vw ; f rozeni := f rozen j } writeback(c) is { 26: for round= 1 to 3 do 27: send W round, tsr, c message to all servers 28: wait for receive W RIT E ACKi round, tsr from S − t servers }
Figure 2. READ implementation (reader r j )
A reader r j maintains the following local variables: (1) arrays pw i , w i , vw i , f rozen i , 1 ≤ i ≤ S that keep the latest copy of the server's s i variables pw, w, vw and f rozen rj and (2) a local timestamp tsr j , that is increased once at the beginning of every READ invocation. We define the predicates readLive(c, i) and readF rozen(c, i) in lines 1 and 2 of Figure 2 , respectively, to denote that: (1) a timestampvalue pair c is seen in the latest copy of either the variable pw i , or the variable w i of the server s i (readLive(c, i)), and (2) a timestamp-value pair c is seen in the latest copy of the f rozen rj .pw of the server s i , under the condition that the last value of f rozen rj .tsr of the server s i is tsr j , the current local READ timestamp (readF rozen(c, i)).
A reader r j can only return a value c.val if a timestampvalue pair c is saf e or saf eF rozen (lines 3,4 and 18, Fig. 2 ), i.e., c must have been either (a) readLive(c, * ) (for saf e) or (b) readF rozen(c, * ) (for saf eF rozen), Initialization: 1: pw, w, vw := ts0, ⊥ ; newread := ∅; ; tsr j := tsr0 2: ∀rj |rj ∈ readers : f rozenr j .pw, f rozenr j .tsr := ts0, ⊥ , tsr0 3: upon receive P W ts, pw , w , f rozen from the writer 4: update(pw, pw ); update(w, w ) 5: ∀j : rj , pw j , tsr j ∈ f rozen do 6:
if tsr j ≥ tsr j then f rozenr j .pw, f rozenr j .tsr := pw j , tsr j 7: newread := rj , tsr j , for all rj such that tsr j > f rozenr j .tsr 8: send P W ACKi ts, newread to the writer 9: upon receive READ tsr , rnd from reader rj 10: if (tsr > tsr j ) and (rnd > 1) then tsr j := tsr 11: send READ ACKi tsr , rnd , pw, w, vw, f rozenr j to rj for at least b + 1 different servers. Moreover, unless the reader return c.val such that c is saf eF rozen (but c is rather saf e), every other timestamp-value pair c that is readLive(c, i) for some s i with a higher timestamp (or the value v = v with the same timestamp) must be deemed invalidw (line 8, Fig. 2 ) and invalidpw (line 9, Fig. 2 ), i.e., highCand(c) must hold (lines 10 and 18, Fig. 2 ). The predicate invalidw(c) holds if S − t servers respond (either in pw i or w i variables) with a timestamp-value pair with a timestamp less than c.ts or with the same timestamp as c.ts but with a value different than c.val. Similarly, the predicate invalidpw(c) holds if S −b−t servers respond in their pw fields with a timestamp-value pair with a timestamp less than c.ts or with the same timestamp as c.ts but with a value different than c.val.
When the reader selects a value c.val that is safe to return, and if this occurs at the end of the first round of the READ invocation, the reader evaluates the predicate f ast(c) (defined in line 7, Figure 2) , to determine whether it can skip the writeback procedure. The f ast(c) holds if c appears in at least b+1 server vw fields or 2b+t+1 servers' pw fields. If the READ rd is lucky and at most f r servers are faulty, the rd is guaranteed to terminate after only one round of the READ invocation, and, hence, rd will be fast.
Indeed, if a last complete WRITE that preceded rd was a fast WRITE wr (resp., if wr is slow), wr has written pw (resp., vw) fields of at least S − f w = t + 2b + f r + 1 servers (resp., S − t = t + b + 1). If a READ is lucky and at most f r servers are faulty, out of these S−f w servers at least S −f w −f r = t+2b+1 (resp., S −t−f r ≥ S −2t = b+1) are correct and will send the READ ACK message containing pw (resp., vw) (no new values are written after wr until rd completes, since rd is contention-free) in the first round of READ. Since rd is synchronous, the reader receives all the responses from all correct servers before the expiration of timer. Hence, the predicate f astpw(pw) (resp., f astvw(vw)) holds, as well as predicates saf e() and highCand() and rd returns pw.val (resp., vw.val) without writing it back.
Otherwise, if rd is not lucky, or more than f r servers fail, the reader may have to write back the value to servers. The writeback follows the communication pattern of the WRITE algorithm (lines 26-28, Fig. 2 ).
Upper Bound
Our upper bound f w + f r ≤ t − b limits the number of actual server failures that fast lucky read/write operations can tolerate, in any optimally resilient atomic storage implementation. In short, the principle lying behind this bound is that the system is asynchronous in general and since malicious servers may change their state to an arbitrary one, they can impose on readers a value that was never written, in case the fast operations skip too many servers. In the following, we first precisely state our upper bound and then proceed by proving it. Proposition 2. Let I be any optimally resilient implementation of a SWMR atomic wait-free storage, with the following properties: (1) in any partial run in which at most f w servers fail, every lucky WRITE operation is fast, and (2) in any partial run in which at most f r servers fail, every lucky READ operation is fast. Then, f w + f r ≤ t − b.
Proof. Let I be any implementation that satisfies properties (1) and (2) of Proposition 2, such that f w + f r > t − b. We prove the case where b > 0 (the case b = 0 is similar and is omitted; see full paper [13] for details). Since I uses 2t + b + 1 servers we can divide the set of servers into five distinct sets: B 1 that contains at least one and at most b servers, B 2 (resp., T 1 ) that contains at most b (resp., t) servers, and F r (resp., F w ) that contains exactly f r ≤ t 5 (resp., f w ≤ t) servers. Without loss of generality, assume that each of these sets contains only one server. If a set has more than one server, we simply modify the runs in a way that all processes inside a set receive the same set of messages, and if they fail, they fail at the same time, in the same way; the proof also holds if any of the sets B 2 , T 1 , F r and F w are empty, as long as |F w | + |F r | > t − b.
Let r 1 be the run in which all servers are correct except F w , which fails by crashing at the beginning of the run. Furthermore, let wr 1 be the lucky WRITE operation invoked by the correct writer in r 1 to write a value v 1 = ⊥ (where ⊥ is the initial value of the storage) in the storage and no other operation is invoked in r 1 . By our assumption on I, wr 1 completes in tr 1 , say at time t 1 , and, moreover, wr 1 is fast. According to the proposition, wr 1 completes after receiving responses to the first message sent to correct servers (B 1 , B 2 , T 1 and F r ). Note that the messages that the writer sends to servers during the first round of wr 1 must not contain authenticated data. In r 1 , depending on the implementation I correct servers are allowed to exchange arbitrary number of messages after sending the replies to the writer. We denote the set of messages servers exchange among themselves executing some operation op as X op .
Let r 1 be the partial run that ends at t 1 , such that r 1 is identical to r 1 up to time t 1 , except that in r 1 : (1) server F w does not fail, but, due to asynchrony, all messages exchanged during wr 1 between F w and the writer remain in transit, and (2) all messages from X wr1 remain in transit. Since the writer cannot distinguish r 1 from r 1 , wr 1 completes in r 1 at time t 1 .
Let r 2 be the partial run that extends partial run r 1 such that: (1) F r fails by crashing at t 1 , (2) rd 1 is a lucky READ operation invoked by the correct reader reader 1 after t 1 , (3) rd 1 is fast and completes at time t 2 6 , (4) no additional operation is invoked in r 2 , (5) r 2 ends at t 2 , (6) all messages that were in transit in r 1 remain in transit in r 2 .
Let r 2 be the partial run, identical to r 2 , except that in r 2 : (1) server F r does not fail, but, due to asynchrony, all messages exchanged during rd 1 between F r and the reader 1 remain in transit, and (2) all the messages from X rd1 are in transit in r 2 . Since the reader 1 and all servers, except F r , cannot distinguish r 2 from r 2 , rd 1 completes in r 2 at time t 2 (note that, both in r 2 and r 2 , reader 1 and all other servers do not receive any message from F r ).
Let r 2 be the partial run, identical to r 2 , except that in r 2 : (1) the writer fails during wr 1 and its messages are never delivered to F r . Since reader 1 and all servers, except F r , cannot distinguish r 2 from r 2 , rd 1 completes in r 2 at time t 2 (note that, both in r 2 and r 2 , reader 1 and all other servers do not receive any message from F r ).
Consider now a partial run r 3 , slightly different from r 2 , in which the writer (resp., reader 1 ) fails during wr 1 (resp., rd 1 ) such that the messages sent by the writer (resp., reader 1 ) in wr 1 (resp., rd 1 ) are delivered only to B 1 (resp., B 1 and F w ) -other servers do not receive any message from the writer (resp., reader 1 ). We refer to the state of B 1 right after the reception of the message from the writer as to σ 1 . In r 3 , T 1 crashes at the beginning of the partial run. Assume that the writer fails at time t f ailw and that reader 1 fails at time t f ailr > t f ailw . In r 3 , by the time t f ailr , servers B 2 and F r did not send nor receive any message. Let rd 2 be a READ operation invoked by the correct reader reader 2 at time t 3 > max(t f ailr , t 2 ). Since the only faulty server in r 3 is T 1 , rd 2 eventually completes, possibly after the messages in X wr1 and X rd1 are delivered. Assume rd 2 completes at time t 3 and returns v R .
Let r 4 be the partial run, identical to r 2 , except that in r 4 : (1) a READ operation rd 2 is invoked by the correct reader reader 2 at t 3 (as in r 3 ), (2) due to asynchrony all messages sent by T 1 to reader 2 and other servers are delayed until after t 3 and (3) at the beginning of r 4 , B 2 fails maliciously: B 2 plays according to the protocol with respect to the writer and reader 1 , but to all other servers and reader 2 , B 2 plays like it never received any message from the writer or reader 1 ; otherwise, B 2 respects the protocol. Note that reader 2 and the servers F w , F r and B 1 cannot distinguish r 4 from r 3 and, hence, rd 2 terminates in r 4 at time t 3 (as in r 3 ) and returns v R . On the other hand, reader 1 cannot distinguish r 4 from r 2 and, hence, rd 1 is fast and returns v 1 . By atomicity, as rd 1 precedes rd 2 , v R must equal v 1 .
Consider now partial run r 5 , identical to r 3 , except that in r 5 : (1) wr 1 is never invoked, (2) B 1 fails maliciously at the beginning of r 5 and forges its state to σ 1 ; otherwise, B 1 sends the same messages as in r 3 , and (3) T 1 is not faulty in r 5 , but, due to asynchrony, all messages sent by T 1 to reader 2 and the other servers are delayed until after t 3 . The reader reader 2 and the servers F w , F r and B 2 cannot distinguish r 5 from r 3 , so rd 2 completes at time t 3 and returns v R , i.e., v 1 . However, by atomicity, in r 5 rd 2 must return ⊥. Since v 1 = ⊥, r 5 violates atomicity.
Discussion
Our tight bound on the best-case complexity of an atomic storage raises several questions, which we discuss below.
Tolerating malicious readers. While it is pretty obvious that a malicious writer can always corrupt the storage, it is appealing to figure out whether it is feasible to tolerate malicious readers.
The problem is basically the following: consider a complete write followed by a read from a malicious reader that writes back the value to the servers, which itself is followed by a read from a correct reader. Our algorithm does not ensure that the malicious reader will not write back a value that was never written by the writer. Hence, a correct reader might return the value written back by the malicious reader instead of the last written value (thus violating atomicity).
In fact, we are not aware of any optimally resilient atomic implementation that tolerates malicious readers without using data authentication or intercommunication among servers. It would be interesting to devise an algorithm that allows fast lucky operations and tolerates malicious readers, in a model where server intercommunication is possible.
Authentication. Our upper bound f w +f r ≤ t−b of Section 4 is based on the possibility for malicious servers to get to an arbitrary state. If we relax the guarantees of an atomic storage, and accept violations of atomicity with a very small probability, we could benefit from data authentication primitives, such as digital signatures [22] or message authentication codes (MACs). Roughly speaking, this would prevent malicious servers from impersonating the writer (run r 5 , Section 4), and hence circumvent our upper bound. However, since the generation of digital signatures is (computationally) expensive, it may impair the benefits of expediting operations in a single communication round (besides, malicious servers would have to be assumed computationally bounded).
On the other hand, (computationally less expensive [7] ) MACs might appear to circumvent our upper bound: since clients are non-malicious, they could share a symmetric key (unknown to servers) to prevent malicious servers from forging values (with a very high probability). However, our upper bound requires every lucky operation to be fast (provided at most f w /f r server failures): it is not clear how clients can distribute the secret key while preserving this requirement (recall that any number of clients can fail, and hence clients would have to establish the key through servers). Moreover, MACs are not suitable for solving the malicious readers issue, since in this case, roughly, computational overhead of MACs grows proportionally to the number of readers. In the following, we discuss an alternative approach to boosting thresholds f w and f r , without relying on any data authentication.
Trading (few) reads. Our upper bound proof of f w + f r ≤ t − b heavily relies on the fact that we require every lucky operation (in particular, every lucky read operation) to be fast. In fact, if we allow a certain number, yet just a small fraction, of lucky read operations to be slow, we can drastically increase the sum of the thresholds f w and f r : f w ≤ t − b and f r ≤ t. Basically, our very same atomic implementation also ensures that: (1) every lucky write can be fast given that at most f w = t − b servers are faulty, and (2) in any sequence of n (0 < n <∝) consecutive lucky reads, there is at most one slow lucky read (regardless of the number of server failures, i.e., f r = t).
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These bounds (f w ≤ t − b and f r ≤ t) are also tight in the following sense. No optimally resilient safe storage algorithm can have every lucky write be fast despite the failure of f w > t − b servers. 8 Trading writes. In our algorithm, unlucky writes execute in three communication round-trips. In this sense, our algorithm does not degrade gracefully as it is known that an atomic storage implementation (for b = t) can be optimally resilient with two communication-round trips for every write. In the full paper [13] , we show that the three communication round-trips worst-case complexity of the write operation is inherent in the general case where b = t, to optimally resilient algorithms where every lucky read is fast despite the failure of at least one server.
It is also natural to ask if our upper bound can be circumvented for the lucky reads, if we are willing to trade certain, or even all writes. In fact it is easy to modify our algorithm such that writes are slow (by removing line 7, Fig. 1 ) and ensure that every lucky read is fast (i.e., f r = t).
Regularity vs Atomicity. The problem of malicious readers can easily be solved by weakening the guarantees of the storage implementation. Namely, our algorithm can easily be modified such that: (1) it tolerates malicious readers and (2) the number of actual server failures every lucky write (resp., read) operation tolerate f w (resp., f r ) is t − b (resp., t). This can be achieved by simple modifications of our algorithm, most notably by removing the writeback procedure in the read implementation. The key idea in achieving optimally resilient wait-free implementation while tolerating malicious readers is to allow readers to modify the state of servers without impacting other readers (by using our freezing mechanism). The price for these improvements is to trade atomicity for regularity. 9 Contending with the ghost. If the writer fails without completing a write wr, every subsequent read operation rd is, according to our definition, considered under contention. Therefore, no rd is lucky and no rd is guaranteed to be fast. Interestingly, in our algorithm, at most three synchronous read operations by some reader r j , invoked after the failure of the writer, need to be slow. Hence, our algorithm quickly overcomes the issues of the writer failure and restores its optimal performance. 10 
Related Work
The area of robust shared storage over unreliable components is not new. Original work considered tolerating crash failures of the servers [2] . More recent work considered tolerating arbitrary [16, 19] server failures. We recall here several results about such implementations that are close to ours. We discuss the implementations that do not use data authentication and implement fast read/write operations, and we compare those to our algorithm. For an accurate comparison of algorithm performance, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume a SWMR setting. 9 More details can be found in the full paper [13] . 10 More details can be found in the full paper [13] .
In [21] , Martin et al. proved that no safe [17] 11 storage implementation is possible if the available number of servers is S ≤ 3t, considering the case where b = t. When b = t, it is not difficult to extend [21] and show that any safe storage implementation requires at least 2t + b + 1 servers, establishing an optimal resilience lower bound for any storage implementation in an asynchronous system. Furthermore, Martin et al. presented in [21] a MWMR optimally resilient atomic storage implementation, called SBQ-L, that uses 3t + 1 servers to tolerate b = t arbitrary server failures without using data authentication, that is not wait-free. In contrast, we present a wait-free optimally resilient implementation that enables fast reads and fast writes under best-case conditions without using data authentication.
The relationship between resilience and fast operations, in the case where b = t, was analyzed by Abraham et al. in [1] . They showed that, in order for every write operation to be fast, at least 4t + 1 servers (actually based shared objects) are required even for the case of a single-writersingle-reader (SWSR) safe storage. Furthermore, they used 3t + 1 passive discs to implement a SWMR wait-free safe and a FW-terminating 12 regular implementations without using data authentication. In their algorithms, writes are never fast, but every contention-free and synchronous (i.e., lucky) read operation is fast despite the actual failure of t shared discs. In contrast, we provide stronger, atomic waitfree, semantics and achieve fast synchronous writes, in addition to achieving fast lucky reads. To achieve this, besides using some novel techniques (e.g., the "freezing" mechanism as well as the fast writing), our algorithm makes use of some techniques established by [1] .
In [12] , Goodson et al. described an implementation of a wait-free MWMR atomic storage, assuming 2t + 2b + 1 servers (thus not being optimally resilient). In [12] , lucky reads are fast, in the case there are no server failures f r = 0. In our SWMR setting, this implementation can trivially be modified to allow every write operation to be fast. The wait-freedom of the atomic storage of [12] relies on the fact that servers store the entire history of the shared data structure, which is not the case with our algorithm. Moreover, our implementation is optimally resilient and achieves fast lucky read/write operations while maximizing the number of server failures that fast atomic operations can tolerate in optimally resilient implementations. The algorithm of [12] tolerates poisonous writes [21] performed by malicious clients to write inconsistent data into servers, but does not solve the issue of malicious readers that we pointed out in Section 5. The algorithm of [12] uses erasure coding in which servers store data fragments, instead of full repli-cation, to improve bandwidth consumption and storage requirements. Our algorithm can easily be modified to support erasure coding, along the lines of [8, 12] .
In [5] , Bazzi and Ding presented a MWMR atomic implementation that used 4t + 1 servers (b = t case), and that can trivially be modified, in the SWMR setting, to achieve fast writes whenever there is no concurrency. However, in [5] reads are never fast and the implementation is not waitfree. 13 Bazzi and Ding also suggested in [6] , an improved, wait-free, version of their algorithm, that still uses 4t + 1 servers, and ensures fast writes when there is no contention; fast reads are not considered.
In [11] , Dutta et al. considered atomic storage implementations that implement fast operations (even in unlucky situations). They derived a tight resilience bound that limits the number of readers that can be supported by such an implementation. Namely, to support R readers, any such emulation must make use of at least (R + 2)t + (R + 1)b + 1 servers. The implementation presented in [11] uses data authentication and is clearly not optimally resilient. In this paper, we focus only on optimally resilient implementations that (1) support any number of readers, (2) do not use data authentication and (3) are optimized for lucky operations.
